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NOTES
CORPORATIONS - VOTING RIGHTS - CLASSIFICATION OF BOARD
TO DEFEAT CUMULATIVE VOTING
Two recent decisions involving the privilege of cumulative
voting and its relationship to classification of directors, rendered
by Ohio and Illinois courts, are worthy of note in connection
with the Louisiana law on the subject. In Humphreys v. Winous
Co.' the stockholders of an Ohio corporation adopted a resolu-
tion amending the code of regulations (by-laws) of the corpora-
tion so as to provide a classified board of directors consisting
of three persons, one to be elected each year for a three-year
term.2 Minority stockholders representing more than forty per-
cent of the stock sought a declaratory judgment to determine
the validity of the resolution. The trial court rendered judgment
upholding the resolution. On appeal, held, reversed. Although
Ohio statutory law3 then permitted unlimited classification of
directors, to allow the election of a single director each year as
sought to be done in the instant case would vitiate entirely the
right to cumulative voting which is made mandatory by statute in
Ohio. The Legislature could not have intended the permission
to classify directors to nullify completely th6 cumulative voting
right; therefore the by-law provision in question was invalid.
In Wolfson v. Avery4 the board of directors of Montgomery
Ward & Company, an Illinois corporation, was composed of nine
members, divided into three classes of three members each. Each
class was to be elected anuually for a three-year term. The statu-
tory law of Illinois permitted classification of a board of di-
rectors of nine or more members. 5 However, the Illinois Con-
stitution6 guarantees to stockholders the right of cumulative
voting in the election of directors. Plaintiff shareholders alleged
that the statute permitting classification was contrary to the
1. 57 Ohio Op. 44, 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio App. 1955).
2. Classification of the board of directors and "staggering" of the terms of
the directors is a system by which the total number of directors are divided into
several groups, called classes and designated Class A directors, Class B directors,
Class 0 directors, etc. The terms of Class A directors expire at the end of the
first year, those of Class B directors at the end of the second year, those of Class
0 at the end of the third year, etc. Thereafter, the term of each director will be
as many years as there are classes, so that each year the directors of a different
class, and only the directors of that class, are elected. Thus, the terms of the di-
rectors are said to be "staggered." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONs 404 (rev. ed.
1946) ; Comment, 22 U. CHi. L. REV. 751, 754 (1955).
3. Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.64 (Page 1953).
4. 126 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. 1955).
5. ILL. Bus. CoRp. ACT § 35.
6. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1870).
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constitutional provision. Judgment was rendered for the plain-
tiff in the trial court. On appeal, held, affirmed. Since classi-
fication of the board would greatly impair the constitutional
guaranty of cumulative voting, the statute permitting classifica-
tion was invalid.
Cumulative voting permits a stockholder to cast as many
votes as he has shares, multiplied by the number of directors
to be elected. He may cast all of his votes for one candidate or
distribute them among two or more candidates.7 The purpose
of cumulative voting is to afford the minority stockholders an
opportunity of representation on the board of directors." With-
out it, the holders of a bare majority of the shares could elect
the entire membership of the board and exclude the minority
from participation in the management of the corporation.9
Cumulative voting cannot be employed in any shareholder action
other than the election of directors ;1o neither can it be employed
when only one director is to be elected.11 Consequently, in order
for cumulative voting to be effective, all the directors to be
chosen at any particular meeting must be voted for collectively
and not by individual elections. 12 As the number of directors
to be chosen increases, so do the minority's chances to gain repre-
sentation, for the number of votes necessary for election of one
director decreases proportionately. 13
Since cumulative voting is unknown at common law, 4 the
right can exist only where it is expressly provided by statute.
State laws authorizing cumulative voting are of two types,
7. LA. R.S. 12:32B (1950) ; BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 404 (rev. ed. 1946) ;
Wright v. Central Calif. Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885); Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St. 150 (1883).
8. Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (1929) ; BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS 404 (rev. ed. 1946).
9. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 404 (rev. ed. 1946).
10. Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co. v. Burrows, 144 Ill. App. 350 (1908)
Bridges v. Staton, 150 N.C. 216, 63 S.E. 892 (1909).
11. See Wright v. Central Calif. Water Co., 67 Cal. 532, 8 Pac. 70 (1885).
This was the basis of the decision in Humphreys v. Winous Co., 57 Ohio Op. 44,
125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio App. 1955).
12. Ibid.
13. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 404 (rev. ed. 1946): "If there are five va-
cancies to be filled, each share of stock may be voted five times for one individual
to fill one vacancy, instead of one vote per share for each of the five vacancies. If
there are five directors to be chosen and one-fifth of the shares are voted for one
nominee, he is practically assured of getting a place on the board, while if only
three directors are to be chosen one-third of the shares would be required for the
same assurance."
14. In re Brophy, 13 N.J. Misc. 462, 179 Atl. 128 (1935) ; State ex rel. Swan-
son v. Perham, 30 Wash.2d 368, 191 P.2d 689 (1948).
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namely, "mandatory" and "permissive." 15 Where the state con-
stitution or statute is "mandatory," cumulative voting rights
cannot be removed by charter or by-law provisions. 6 On the
contrary, where the state statute is "permissive," as in Louisi-
ana,17 cumulative voting is authorized only if the charter or by-
laws of the corporation provide for it,18 or in some cases, do not
prohibit it.' 9 In states having "mandatory" provisions, certain
means have been employed by the majority shareholders in an
atiempt to circumvent or nullify the requirement for cumulative
voting.20 For example, where the minority shareholders have
already chosen their directors, board meetings are sometimes
replaced by "informal discussions" among majority directors. In
other instances, committees without minority representation are
appointed by the board to perform acts of management. In small
corporations, to the extent that it is legally possible to do so,2'
the board may relinquish its policy-making powers to the of-
ficers of the corporation, thereby excluding the minority from
participation in management. Again, if the majority has the
power to remove directors without cause, it may seek to deprive
the minority of its representation on the board by removing the
director who was elected by the minority through cumulative
voting.2 2 Through other devices, the majority may seek to pre-
vent the minority group from effectively utilizing its privilege
of cumulative voting. For example, a reduction of the number
of directors to be elected will make it proportionately more dif-
ficult for the minority group to cumulate enough votes to elect
a director.23 Classification of the board with the resultant
15. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 406 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Comment, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 751 (1955).
16. See note 15 supra.
17. LA. R.S. 12:32B (1950).
18. See note 15 supra.
19. See, e.g., TEXAS Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.29D, Texas Laws 1955, c. 64.
20. The devices listed here, which are used to effect this end, are discussed
more fully in Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (1955).
21. The directors cannot completely abdicate their authority to a committee or
to the officers. Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mutual Casualty Co., 41 F.2d
588 (7th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 893 (1930).
22. Comment, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 752 (1955). There is authority, how-
ever, for the proposition that adoption of a cumulative voting provision will restrict
a pre-existing power of removal without cause so as to prevent use of this device
to deprive the minority of their representative on the board of directors. In re
Rogers Imports, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1952). In Louisiana a director
elected by virtue of cumulative voting cannot be removed except for cause. LA.
R.S. 12:34C(4) (1.950) : "If a director has been elected by the exercise of the
privilege of cumulative voting, such director may not be removed under the pro-
visions of this paragraph except for cause."
23. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 404, n. 21 (rev. ed. 1946) : Comment, 22 U.
Cur. L. REV. 751, 754 (1955).
19561
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI
"staggering" of the terms of its members achieves a similar
result, since it decreases the number of directors to be elected
each year.2 4
The instant cases involved attempts to classify the respective
boards and "stagger" the terms of the directors so that only
one-third of the board would be elected each year and the effect
of cumulative voting neutralized or greatly diminished. It should
be noted that in both cases the state corporation laws permitted
classification of the board. 25 The Ohio court felt, however, that
to permit classification where a three-man board was concerned
would result in a violation of the more specific prohibition in
its statutes against restricting or qualifying the right of cumula-
tive voting.26 It did not, it would seem, entirely invalidate the
use of classification where its adoption would not completely
nullify cumulative voting, because unlike the Illinois decision,
only a by-law was invalidated and not the statute permitting
classification. Thus by implication a fact situation such as found
in the Wolfson case might be proper in Ohio.2 7 On the other
hand, the Illinois court went much further and invalidated its
classification statute because under its Constitution 28 any im-
pairment of the right to vote cumulatively was not allowed and
24. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 404 (rev. ed. 1946) ; Comment, 22 U. CH. L.
REV. 751, 754 (1955). The effect of such reduction was cogently explained in
the Wolfson case: "In an election of a full board of nine directors, the owners of
10 per cent of the stock voted, plus one share, could elect one out of the nine
directors to be elected. On the other hand, if the board of directors is classified so
that only three members are elected each year, it would require 25 per cent of the
stock voted, plus one share, to gain a single seat on the board. Where all nine
members are elected at once, a minority holding 49 per cent of the stock could
elect four .... If only three members of the board are elected each year, however,
the holders of 49 per cent would be able to elect only one director at each election,
and could never have more than three directors on the board at one time . . . . It
is evident therefore, that as the number of directors up for election decreases the
number of share votes necessary to elect one director increases." Wolfson v. Avery,
126 N.E. 701, 704 (I1. 1955), citing WILLIAMS, CUMULATIE VOTING 48-49
(1951).
25. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.64 (Page 1953) ; ILL. Bus. CoRp. ACT § 35 (1933).
26. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.58 (Page 1953).
27. This seems to be borne out by the change in the Ohio classification pro-
vision made in 1955 by the new Ohio Corporation Law which took effect after
the Winous decision. OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.57(B) (Page, Supp. 1955).
Under the new law, each class of directors must be comprised of no less than three
directors each. Since the mandatory cumulative voting requirement is continued
in effect, it would appear the Ohio Legislature intended that so long as classifica-
tion does not do away with cumulative voting entirely, it is permissible. See Final
Report of the Corporation Law Committee of the Ohio Bar Association following
the new statutory section to the effect that the change was made to meet the objec-
tion that under the old law it was possible for a three-man board to be so classi-
fied that only a single director need be elected annually and he would in all cases
be elected by a majority vote.
28. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1870).
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it had no doubt that classification of directors did that very
thing.
Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 12:32B states that "the
articles [of incorporation] may provide that in the election of
directors each shareholder of record shall have the right" to
vote cumulatively.29 (Emphasis added.) Unlike the provisions
in the instant cases, the privilege of cumulative voting is thus
permissive and not mandatory. Since the privilege must be set
out in the articles of incorporation, it may be granted or denied
as the incorporators may originally desire or as the requisite
number of shareholders may later determine when amending
the articles. Furthermore, classification of directors, while not
spelled out, is permitted by section 34 of the Louisiana Corpora-
tion Act.30 Consequently classification schemes similar to either
type adopted in the instant cases undoubtedly would be held
valid in Louisiana. It stands to reason, that if the privilege of
cumulative voting can be granted or denied in toto, a partial
abridgement that might result from the proper adoption of a
plan of classification could not be invalid. The sole statutory pro-
tection given to minority shareholders in Louisiana if cumula-
tive voting is permitted is the prohibition against removal of a
director elected by cumulative voting, except for cause.31 This,
at least, would effectively bar the majority shareholders from
excluding the minority shareholders from participation in man-
agement once the minority had elected its representatives. One
other mode of protection for the minority having cumulative
voting privileges suggests itself. The minority can insist at
the time of incorporation or upon amendment of the articles
that the articles provide a nearly unanimous vote be required
to amend the articles with respect to the method of selection
and changing the number of directors.32 True, this insistence
29. LA. R.S. 12:32B (1950).
30. See id. 12:34B, which provides in part: "The names, classifications, and
terms'of office of the first directors may be stated in the articles." (Emphasis
added.) and id. 12:34C: "The number, classifications, qualifications, terms of of-
fice, manner of election, time and place of meeting, and the powers and duties of
the directors may, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, be prescribed by the
articles or by-laws." (Emphasis added.)
31. Id. 12:34C(4).
32. A 95% requirement is suggested as probably being the safest provision. A
lower one might permit the majority to muster enough votes to amend the articles;
a requirement of unanimity might be challenged as invalid. However, a require-
ment of unanimity to abolish or restrict cumulative voting might be upheld by the
court because it would not result in a stalemate of corporate action. LA. R.S.
12:42B (1950) authorizes any number over a majority that the incorporators may
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may not be effective against majority determination to the con-
trary, but if the majority is willing initially to grant the priv-
ilege of cumulative voting, it should be willing to adopt some
such provision in the articles to insure its continuation.
James M. Dozier, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DEFENSE OF INSANITY - AN APPRAISAL
OF STATE V. WATTS
Prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1928 the plea of insanity was not a special plea. Rather, the de-
fense of insanity was included under and tried with the general
plea of not guilty.' The Code, however, includes insanity as one
of the four possible pleas to an indictment; it provides that a
defendant who intends to rely upon insanity at the time of the
commission of the crime must file a special plea to that effect.2
It provides also that all pleas must be entered at arraignment,
and thereafter it is within the trial judge's discretion to permit
changes of pleas.3 Shortly after the adoption of the Code the
Supreme Court interpreted the articles relating to the newly
established insanity plea, in the case of State v. Watts. 4 In that
case the defendant had pleaded not guilty at arraignment. On
the day of the trial, thirteen days later, he moved to change his
plea to insanity at the time of the commission of the homicide.
Holding that the motion came too late, the trial judge refused to
permit the change and defendant was found guilty. The Supreme
Court reversed on rehearing, and held that the defense could
properly be pleaded even on the day of trial, stating that "the
plea of insanity under these Code articles is a matter of right
choose to require to amend: "[A]n amendment altering the articles may be adopted
by the vote of the holders of two-thirds of the voting power of all shareholders
entitled under the articles to vote, or by such larger or smaller vote, not less than
a majority, as the articles may require." (Emphasis added.)
1. State v. Brodes, 156 La. 428, 100 So. 610 (1924).
2. LA. R.S. 15:261 (1950) : "There are four kinds of pleas to an indictment:
"(1) Guilty
"(2) Not guilty
"(3) Former jeopardy
"(4) Insanity."
3. LA. R.S. 15:255 (1950) : "Defendant must plead when arraigned; and if he
refuse, or stand mute, the plea of not guilty shall be entered for him."
LA. R.S. 15:265 (1950) : "The defendant may at any time, with the consent of
the court, withdraw his plea of not guilty and then set up some other plea or
demur or move to quash the indictment."
4. 171 La. 618, 131 So. 729 (1930).
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